June 2006

Why it’s hard for prisoners to sue prison systems

From Daniel Brook’s “The Problem of Prison Rape” (Legal Affairs: March/April 2004):

When inmates seek civil damages against the prison system, as [Roderick Johnson, a 35-year-old African-American who is suing the Texas Department of Criminal Justice] has done, they must prove not merely that prison officials should have done more to prevent abuse but that they showed “deliberate indifference” – that is, that they had actual knowledge that an inmate was at risk and disregarded it. Showing that a prison guard should have known is not enough, no matter how obvious the signs of abuse.

This standard was established by the Supreme Court in the 1994 case Farmer v. Brennan, in which a transsexual inmate imprisoned for credit card fraud sued federal prison officials for ignoring his rape behind bars. While the court affirmed that prison rape is a violation of an inmate’s constitutional rights and stated plainly that sexual assault is “not part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses,” it set up formidable barriers to establishing the culpability of corrections staff. At the cellblock level, the “deliberate indifference” standard discourages prison guards from shining a light into dark corners. What they don’t know can’t hurt them.

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History & numbers on prison rape

From Daniel Brook’s “The Problem of Prison Rape” (Legal Affairs: March/April 2004):

In his 18 months at [the maximum-security Allred Unit in Iowa Park, Tex.], [Roderick Johnson, a 35-year-old African-American who is suing the Texas Department of Criminal Justice] did time as the property of the Bloods, the Crips, the Mandingo Warriors, and the Mexican Mafia, all of whom forced him to have sex with their members. They also sold his services to other inmates, usually for between $5 and $10. (A cigarette in Allred goes for $1.50.) …

The prevalence of rape in prison is fearsome. Line officers recently surveyed in one southern state estimated that one in five male prisoners were being coerced into sex; among higher-ranking officials, the estimate was one in eight. Prisoners themselves estimated one in three. (Female prisoners are the victims of rape as well, though they are usually assaulted by male guards, not other inmates; the phenomenon of male-on-male prison rape is generally studied separately.) …

The traditional rationale for prison rape is the lack of women, but most psychologists consider this facile. They see prison rape mainly as a means by which people who have been stripped of control over the most basic aspects of their lives – when to eat a meal, take a shower, or watch TV – can reclaim some sense of power. As one Louisiana prisoner, Wilbert Rideau, wrote, “the psychological pain involved in such an existence creates an urgent and terrible need for reinforcement of [a prisoner’s] sense of manhood and personal worth.” Others believe that prisoners become rapists out of fear of becoming victims themselves; it’s a choice between becoming predator or prey. The psychologist Daniel Lockwood, in his study Prison Sexual Violence, calls this strategy “pre-emptive self-defense.” …

IN 1826, IN WHAT WAS LIKELY THE FIRST PUBLISHED MENTION of prison rape in the history of the republic, the Rev. Louis Dwight wrote that “Boys are Prostituted to the Lust of old Convicts” throughout the institutions he surveyed from Massachusetts to Georgia. Dwight, the founder of the Prison Discipline Society of Boston, a prison reform group, wrote that “Nature and humanity cry aloud for redemption from this dreadful degradation.” It was not until the 21st century, however, that the nation saw its first anti-prison-rape legislation.

Last year, Congress passed the Prison Rape Reduction Act, which allocates $60 million to support rape-prevention programs run by federal, state, and local corrections staff and to aid investigations and punishment of perpetrators. The bill, which enjoyed bipartisan support in the House and the Senate, also requires states to collect statistics on prison rape.

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Why courts don’t use legal-size documents any longer

From Suzanne Snider’s “Old Yeller” (Legal Affairs: May/June 2005):

The legal-size legal pad has been under attack since as early as 1982, when then Chief Justice Warren Burger banished legal-size documents from federal courts. One informal survey estimated Burger’s move saved almost $16 million through more efficient use of storage space. Several states followed the federal government’s lead …

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A history of the public notice

From Sasha Issenberg’s “On Notice” (Legal Affairs: July/August 2005):

In the Middle Ages, the Crown designated a half-dozen sites in London where a herald would read proclamations from the king. These announcements first found their way into print in 1665 when the London Gazette, considered the first English-language newspaper (at least as we now understand the term), began publishing. It was the Crown that put out the Gazette, and thus the newspaper was little more than a broadsheet filled with public notices.

In the 1690s, private competition reached the London newsstand. Yet even those newspapers that were not published directly by the government continued to seek its consent and imprimatur. In 1704, across the Atlantic, a newspaper called The Boston Newsletter hit the streets of the Hub; like many early American newspapers, it bore the slogan, “Published by Authority.” Though newspapers had ceased to exist merely for the purpose of publishing government decrees, they continued to run the notices as proof of the papers’ journalistic credibility. “Unlike in our day, it was looked at as an act of authenticity,” says Charles Clark, a professor emeritus of history at the University of New Hampshire who wrote about early American newspapering in a book called The Public Prints.

Sometimes these announcements appeared under the rubric “Proclamations for Royal Government,” Clark explained, but usually papers “just printed the notices in what we would think of as the news columns – even though that distinction is a bit of a stretch for those days. In many instances the notices constituted the news.” (Toward the end of the 18th century, according to Clark, newspapers also began to feature private-sector legal announcements: creditors demanding payment were popular. “The most frequent things,” Clark said, chuckling, “are men putting in notices: ‘My wife is leaving my bed and board. I shall no longer be responsible for her debt.’ “) …

In 1789, among the acts of the first session of the Congress was a directive to the secretary of state to publish all bills, orders, resolutions, and votes in at least three newspapers.

For its efforts at transparency, the fledgling government was rewarded with an increasingly suspicious press. During the 1790s, the Philadelphia-based Gazette of the United States made it clear that government would not be left to speak for itself through notices; the paper placed a correspondent in Congress. “He reported what he saw, not the official words,” Clark said. After the election of George Washington, the colonial press that had cuddled with government gradually became American media that sought to establish distance from it. In addition to soliciting the government for announcements, the press began to cover the government journalistically. …

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The Mann Act as problematic law

From Roderick M. Hills, Jr.’s “The Federalist Capers” (Legal Affairs: May/June 2005):

BY CONTRAST WITH THE COURT’S RECORD IN ECONOMIC MATTERS, the pre-New-Deal court was oddly reluctant to impose any limits on federally sponsored cultural conservatism. The Mann Act, which prohibited any person from aiding in the interstate transportation of a “woman or girl” for “prostitution, or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose,” provides a useful illustration of the limits that judicially enforced federalism will go to.

Congress enacted the Mann Act in 1910 by comfortable majorities, in the wake of a national furor over allegations that young women were being kidnapped by syndicates of brothels and forced to work as prostitutes. In retrospect, historians explain the panic over “white slavery” as largely attributable to anxieties over immigration (the syndicates were said to be run by foreigners, especially foreign Jews) and urbanization, which led to a rise in the numbers of unaccompanied single women visible in public places.

Although the act was inspired by fears of coerced prostitution, it was soon enforced by the federal government as part of a crusade against nonmarital sex in general. As David Langum has shown in Crossing Over the Line, a large majority of the FBI’s Mann Act investigations during the 1920s was for noncommercial offenses, typically prosecutions of unmarried but romantically involved couples who crossed state lines. Even the purpose of protecting women from coercion was soon dropped. The Department of Justice took the view that the female “victim” should generally be prosecuted as a co-conspirator if she consented to “immoral” travel. Charges were frequently foregone if the “victim” married the perpetrator, suggesting that the statute was really a federal effort to protect males’ control over their wives and daughters. Though the federal government abandoned the effort to enforce the Mann Act in the 1930s against noncommercial sex, J. Edgar Hoover later used it in raids on brothels to collect information about public persons, like Charlie Chaplin, whom he regarded as subversive.

In short, the Mann Act was everything that you would expect from centralized enforcement of sexual morality – oppressive, gratuitous, and subject to all the abuses of prosecutorial discretion. The regulation of interstate transportation was a thin pretext for federal intervention, given that the act’s authors surely were not concerned that the states were somehow incompetent to regulate sexual morality within their boundaries.

In light of all of these concerns, you might expect that the Supreme Court would have found the Mann Act to be an easy case for invalidation under principles of federalism. But the court unanimously upheld the act in 1913 in Hoke v. United States, and then also upheld its application to noncommercial consensual sexual liaisons four years later in Caminetti v. United States.

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Bird in Flight, Brancusi, & US Customs law

From Stéphanie Giry’s “An Odd Bird” (Legal Affairs: September/October 2002):

After a weeklong journey from France, crates of sculptures by Constantin Brancusi arrived in New York harbor on the steamship Paris, escorted by the artist Marcel Duchamp. It was October 1926 and the sculptures were to be exhibited in the city at the avant-garde Brummer Gallery. United States Customs officials opened the crates and uncovered 20 mysterious disks, eggs, and flame-like forms of carved wood, polished metal, or smooth marble. One work in particular left them dumbfounded: a thin, 4 1/4-foot-tall piece of shiny yellow bronze with a gently tapering bulge called Bird in Space. It didn’t look like a bird to the officials, so they refused to exempt it from customs duties as a work of art. They imposed the standard tariff for manufactured objects of metal: 40 percent of the sale price, or $240 (about $2,400 in today’s dollars). …

Under pressure, the customs office agreed to reconsider its decision. In the meantime, it released Bird in Space and other sculptures, on bond and under the classification “Kitchen Utensils and Hospital Supplies,” so they could be exhibited at the Brummer Gallery and then at the Arts Club in Chicago.

Both shows were successes, but in February 1927 the federal customs appraiser F.J.H. Kracke confirmed his office’s initial finding that any sculptures Brancusi sold in the United States, like Steichen’s Bird, would be subject to duty. In an interview with the New York Evening Post, Kracke explained his ruling: “Several men, high in the art world were asked to express their opinions for the Government…. One of them told us, ‘If that’s art, hereafter I’m a bricklayer.’ Another said, ‘Dots and dashes are as artistic as Brancusi’s work.’ In general, it was their opinion that Brancusi left too much to the imagination.”

The next month, Steichen filed Brancusi v. United States to appeal customs’ decision. Abstract Art was now on trial. …

Six influential figures testified for Brancusi: Steichen, who was an established photographer; the sculptor Jacob Epstein; Forbes Watson, the editor of the review The Arts; Frank Crowninshield, the editor of Vanity Fair; William Henry Fox, the director of the Brooklyn Museum of Art; and the art critic Henry McBride. The witnesses for the government, the sculptors Robert Aitken and Thomas Jones, now long forgotten, enjoyed great academic reputations at the time. Judge Young was new to the Customs Court. The 75-year-old Waite had been serving on it and its earlier incarnation, the Board of General Appraisers, for 25 years.

Also present in the courtroom as Exhibit 1 was the Bird, which sat on a table, shimmering and soaring toward the ceiling while the lawyers debated whether it was an “original sculpture” or a metal “article or ware not specially provided for” under the 1922 Tariff Act. For the Bird to enter the country duty-free under the act, Steichen’s lawyers had to prove that Brancusi was a professional sculptor; that the Bird was a work of art; that it was original; and that it had no practical purpose.

By 1927 and after four one-man shows in New York, there was little question that the 51-year-old Brancusi was recognized as a professional sculptor – controversial perhaps, but definitely well-known. There was also little question that the Bird had no utility, even though the customs office had released it under the classification “Kitchen Utensil.”

But because Brancusi had shown four other bird sculptures like Steichen’s at the Brummer show, it wasn’t clear whether Steichen’s was the only one of its kind. And it was far from clear whether the Bird could be called art, because it looked like nothing anyone had ever seen before.

During the hearing, Judges Young and Waite placed great emphasis on the Bird’s title. The Tariff Act didn’t require that sculptures be realistic, but under a 1916 Customs Court decision called United States v. Olivotti sculptures qualified as art works only if they were “chisel[ed]” or “carve[d]” “imitations of natural objects,” chiefly the human form representing such objects “in their true proportions.” …

When he was 26, according to legend, Brancusi set out on foot on the 1,200-mile journey to Paris; however he got there, in 1904 he enrolled at the prestigious école des Beaux Arts. The decade that followed was marked for him by poverty, hard work, and eventually a place in the avant-garde community among Duchamp, Ezra Pound, Amedeo Modigliani, and Erik Satie, who would become his friends and transforming influences. At an exhibit in Paris in 1906, Auguste Rodin, then the towering figure in sculpture, spotted one of Brancusi’s pieces and invited him to work in his studio. Brancusi declined because he believed “nothing grows well in the shadow of a big tree.” …

But to Thomas Jones, a professor at Columbia who testified for the customs office, the Bird was “too abstract and a misuse of the form of sculpture.” Robert Aitken, the government’s other witness, said that art should “arouse an unusual emotional reaction” and “[stir] the esthetics, the sense of beauty.” …

Every work [by Brancusi] was unique and made of a different material, with different proportions and a different harmony. Brancusi had carved variations of the Bird out of white, yellow, and black marble and bronze of varying composition, each time coaxing the stone or the metal to reveal something new about the form. As Brancusi explained, all of those pieces were part of the same search: “All my life I’ve been looking for one thing, the essence of flight.” …

The court’s sensibility favored Brancusi. In its decision of November 1928, drafted by Judge Waite, the court held:

The object now under consideration … is beautiful and symmetrical in outline, and while some difficulty might be encountered in associating it with a bird, it is nevertheless pleasing to look at and highly ornamental, and as we hold under the evidence that it is the original production of a professional sculptor and is in fact a piece of sculpture and a work of art according to the authorities above referred to, we sustain the protest and find that it is entitled to free entry.

Judge Waite’s decision was seen as a victory not only for Brancusi but also for avant-garde art, because it dismissed the Olivotti requirement and recognized the importance of a new school that “portray[ed] abstract ideas rather than … imitate natural objects.” …

But the decision’s focus on the decorative qualities of the Bird made the ruling just as perishable as the standard in the 12-year-old one it replaced. And its reliance on the judges’ personal taste made its application perhaps more arbitrary and restrictive. Many of the works that made the renown of Duchamp, the chaperon of the Bird on its trip to New York and one of its staunchest defenders, would not have passed the test, for example. Duchamp’s “ready-made” sculptures of a bottle rack (Bottle Dryer, 1914) and a urinal (Fountain, 1917), objects he borrowed from daily life and, with more than a hint of irony, labeled works of art, would not have satisfied Judge Waite’s taste for the “beautiful,” “symmetrical,” and “ornamental.”

The Brancusi decision may have done away with the requirement that sculptures must be figurative to be art, but it took years for customs law to shed other unreasonable limitations on the free import of artwork. In 1931, tapestries were deemed dutiable because they were made of wool – the material determined the artistic merit. In 1971, the customs court found that six carved door panels destined for a church were dutiable because, as part of the doors, they were utilitarian objects. It wasn’t for 61 years, until the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of 1989, that customs law allowed free entry to works that are both artistic and functional.

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Arnold Rothstein, criminal kingpin

From Daniel A. Nathan’s “The Big Fix” (Legal Affairs: March/April 2004):

THE BLACK SOX SCANDAL was the sports crime of the 20th century. In a complicated and poorly conceived and executed conspiracy, several prominent Chicago White Sox ballplayers teamed up with gamblers to lose the 1919 World Series to the Cincinnati Reds. …

Of those artfully deceitful manipulators, Arnold Rothstein was the most skillful, a criminal kingpin who had his hand in all manner of illicit endeavors. Known as “the Big Bankroll” and “the Great Brain,” Rothstein helped invent organized crime, and his influence survived his death in 1928. …

There is no denying that Rothstein was clever. A former pool shark, Rothstein managed to graduate from being a small-time bookmaker to what one historian describes as an important “intermediary between the underworld and upper world of New York.” He established successful gambling houses in New York City and Saratoga (then, as now, a popular summer resort town for the well-to-do, especially for those who like to play the ponies) and political connections with Tammany Hall. Rothstein, Pietrusza notes, “pretty much invented the floating crap game,” the illicit diversion later made famous by the Broadway musical Guys and Dolls, on his way to becoming “America’s most notorious gambler.” He was a bootlegger, a labor racketeer, a racetrack owner, a real estate magnate, a bail bondsman, a loan shark, a fence, and, according to [David Pietrusza, author of Rothstein: The Life, Times, and Murder of the Criminal Genius Who Fixed the 1919 World Series], the “founder and mastermind of the modern American drug trade.”

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