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	<title>GranneBlog &#187; tricky</title>
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		<title>Malware forges online bank statements to hide fraud</title>
		<link>http://blog.granneman.com/2009/10/30/malware-forges-online-bank-statements-to-hide-fraud/</link>
		<comments>http://blog.granneman.com/2009/10/30/malware-forges-online-bank-statements-to-hide-fraud/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 30 Oct 2009 18:42:31 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Scott Granneman</dc:creator>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.granneman.com/?p=1526</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[From Kim Zetter&#8217;s &#8220;New Malware Re-Writes Online Bank Statements to Cover Fraud&#8221; (Wired: 30 September 2009): New malware being used by cybercrooks does more than let hackers loot a bank account; it hides evidence of a victim’s dwindling balance by rewriting online bank statements on the fly, according to a new report. The sophisticated hack [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>From Kim Zetter&#8217;s &#8220;<a href="http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/09/rogue-bank-statements/">New Malware Re-Writes Online Bank Statements to Cover Fraud</a>&#8221; (<em>Wired</em>: 30 September 2009):</p>
<blockquote><p>New malware being used by cybercrooks does more than let hackers loot a bank account; it hides evidence of a victim’s dwindling balance by rewriting online bank statements on the fly, according to a new report.</p>
<p>The sophisticated hack uses a Trojan horse program installed on the victim’s machine that alters html coding before it’s displayed in the user’s browser, to either erase evidence of a money transfer transaction entirely from a bank statement, or alter the amount of money transfers and balances.</p>
<p>The ruse buys the crooks time before a victim discovers the fraud, though won’t work if a victim uses an uninfected machine to check his or her bank balance.</p>
<p>The novel technique was employed in August by a gang who targeted customers of leading German banks and stole Euro 300,000 in three weeks, according to Yuval Ben-Itzhak, chief technology officer of computer security firm Finjan.</p>
<p>&hellip;</p>
<p>The victims’ computers are infected with the Trojan, known as URLZone, after visiting compromised legitimate web sites or rogue sites set up by the hackers.</p>
<p>Once a victim is infected, the malware grabs the consumer’s log in credentials to their bank account, then contacts a control center hosted on a machine in Ukraine for further instructions. The control center tells the Trojan how much money to wire transfer, and where to send it. To avoid tripping a bank’s automated anti-fraud detectors, the malware will withdraw random amounts, and check to make sure the withdrawal doesn’t exceed the victim’s balance.</p>
<p>The money gets transferred to the legitimate accounts of unsuspecting money mules who’ve been recruited online for work-at-home gigs, never suspecting that the money they’re allowing to flow through their account is being laundered. The mule transfers the money to the crook’s chosen account. The cyber gang Finjan tracked used each mule only twice, to avoid fraud pattern detection.</p>
<p>&hellip;</p>
<p>The researchers also found statistics in the command tool showing that out of 90,000 visitors to the gang’s rogue and compromised websites, 6,400 were infected with the URLZone trojan. Most of the attacks Finjan observed affected people using Internet Explorer browsers &hellip;</p>
<p>Finjan provided law enforcement officials with details about the gang’s activities and says the hosting company for the Ukraine server has since suspended the domain for the command and control center. But Finjan estimates that a gang using the scheme unimpeded could rake in about $7.3 million annually.
</p></blockquote>
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		<title>Various confidence scams, tricks, &amp; frauds</title>
		<link>http://blog.granneman.com/2009/07/05/various-confidence-scams-tricks-frauds/</link>
		<comments>http://blog.granneman.com/2009/07/05/various-confidence-scams-tricks-frauds/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 06 Jul 2009 03:31:41 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Scott Granneman</dc:creator>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.granneman.com/?p=1456</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[From &#8220;List of confidence tricks&#8221; (Wikipedia: 3 July 2009): Get-rich-quick schemes Get-rich-quick schemes are extremely varied. For example, fake franchises, real estate &#8220;sure things&#8221;, get-rich-quick books, wealth-building seminars, self-help gurus, sure-fire inventions, useless products, chain letters, fortune tellers, quack doctors, miracle pharmaceuticals, Nigerian money scams, charms and talismans are all used to separate the mark [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>From &#8220;<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_confidence_tricks">List of confidence tricks</a>&#8221; (Wikipedia: 3 July 2009):</p>
<blockquote><h3>Get-rich-quick schemes</h3>
<p><strong>Get-rich-quick schemes</strong> are extremely varied. For example, fake franchises, real estate &#8220;sure things&#8221;, get-rich-quick books, wealth-building seminars, self-help gurus, sure-fire inventions, useless products, chain letters, fortune tellers, quack doctors, miracle pharmaceuticals, Nigerian money scams, charms and talismans are all used to separate the mark from his money. Variations include the pyramid scheme, Ponzi scheme and Matrix sale.</p>
<p>Count Victor Lustig sold the &#8220;money-printing machine&#8221; which could copy $100 bills. The client, sensing huge profits, would buy the machines for a high price (usually over $30,000). Over the next twelve hours, the machine would produce just two more $100 bills, but after that it produced only blank paper, as its supply of hidden $100 bills would have become exhausted. This type of scheme is also called the &#8220;money box&#8221; scheme.</p>
<p>&hellip;</p>
<p><strong>The wire game</strong>, as depicted in the movie <em>The Sting</em>, trades on the promise of insider knowledge to beat a gamble, stock trade or other monetary action. In the wire game, a &#8220;mob&#8221; composed of dozens of grifters simulates a &#8220;wire store&#8221;, i.e., a place where results from horse races are received by telegram and posted on a large board, while also being read aloud by an announcer. The griftee is given secret foreknowledge of the race results minutes before the race is broadcast, and is therefore able to place a sure bet at the wire store. In reality, of course, the con artists who set up the wire store are the providers of the inside information, and the mark eventually is led to place a large bet, thinking it to be a sure win. At this point, some mistake is made, which actually makes the bet a loss. &hellip;</p>
<p><strong>Salting</strong> or <strong>to salt the mine</strong> are terms for a scam in which gems or gold ore are planted in a mine or on the landscape, duping the greedy mark into purchasing shares in a worthless or non-existent mining company.[2] During the Gold Rush, scammers would load shotguns with gold dust and shoot into the sides of the mine to give the appearance of a rich ore, thus &#8220;salting the mine&#8221;. &hellip;</p>
<p>The <strong>Spanish Prisoner</strong> scam – and its modern variant, the <strong>advance fee fraud</strong> or <strong>Nigerian scam</strong> – take advantage of the victim’s greed. The basic premise involves enlisting the mark to aid in retrieving some stolen money from its hiding place. The victim sometimes believes he can cheat the con artists out of their money, but anyone trying this has already fallen for the essential con by believing that the money is there to steal (see also Black money scam). &hellip;</p>
<p>Many conmen employ extra tricks to keep the victim from going to the police. A common ploy of investment scammers is to encourage a mark to use money concealed from tax authorities. The mark cannot go to the authorities without revealing that he or she has committed tax fraud. Many swindles involve a minor element of crime or some other misdeed. The mark is made to think that he or she will gain money by helping fraudsters get huge sums out of a country (the classic Nigerian scam); hence marks cannot go to the police without revealing that they planned to commit a crime themselves.</p>
<p>&hellip;</p>
<h3>Gold brick scams</h3>
<p>Gold brick scams involve selling a tangible item for more than it is worth; named after selling the victim an allegedly golden ingot which turns out to be gold-coated lead.</p>
<p>&hellip;</p>
<p><strong>Pig-in-a-poke</strong> originated in the late Middle Ages. The con entails a sale of a (suckling) &#8220;pig&#8221; in a &#8220;poke&#8221; (bag). The bag ostensibly contains a live healthy little pig, but actually contains a cat (not particularly prized as a source of meat, and at any rate, quite unlikely to grow to be a large hog). If one buys a &#8220;pig in a poke&#8221; without looking in the bag (a colloquial expression in the English language, meaning &#8220;to be a sucker&#8221;), the person has bought something of less value than was assumed, and has learned firsthand the lesson caveat emptor.</p>
<p>&hellip;</p>
<p>The <strong>Thai gem scam</strong> involves layers of con men and helpers who tell a tourist in Bangkok of an opportunity to earn money by buying duty-free jewelry and having it shipped back to the tourist&#8217;s home country. The mark is driven around the city in a tuk-tuk operated by one of the con men, who ensures that the mark meets one helper after another, until the mark is persuaded to buy the jewelry from a store also operated by the swindlers. The gems are real but significantly overpriced. This scam has been operating for 20 years in Bangkok, and is said to be protected by Thai police and politicians. A similar scam usually runs in parallel for custom-made suits.</p>
<p>&hellip;</p>
<h3>Extortion or false-injury tricks</h3>
<p>The <strong>badger game</strong> extortion is often perpetrated on married men. The mark is deliberately coerced into a compromising position, a supposed affair for example, then threatened with public exposure of his acts unless blackmail money is paid.</p>
<p>&hellip;</p>
<p><strong>The Melon Drop</strong> is a scam in which the scammer will intentionally bump into the mark and drop a package containing (already broken) glass. He will blame the damage on the clumsiness of the mark, and demand money in compensation. This con arose when artists discovered that the Japanese paid large sums of money for watermelons. The scammer would go to a supermarket to buy a cheap watermelon, then bump into a Japanese tourist and set a high price.</p>
<p>&hellip;</p>
<h3>Gambling tricks</h3>
<p><strong>Three-card Monte</strong>, &#8216;Find The Queen&#8217;, the &#8220;Three-card Trick&#8221;, or &#8220;Follow The Lady&#8221;, is (except for the props) essentially the same as the probably centuries-older <strong>shell game</strong> or <em>thimblerig</em>. The trickster shows three playing cards to the audience, one of which is a queen (the &#8220;lady&#8221;), then places the cards face-down, shuffles them around and invites the audience to bet on which one is the queen. At first the audience is skeptical, so the shill places a bet and the scammer allows him to win. In one variation of the game, the shill will (apparently surreptitiously) peek at the lady, ensuring that the mark also sees the card. This is sometimes enough to entice the audience to place bets, but the trickster uses sleight of hand to ensure that they always lose, unless the conman decides to let them win, hoping to lure them into betting much more. The mark loses whenever the dealer chooses to make him lose. This con appears in the Eric Garcia novel <em>Matchstick Men</em> and is featured in the movie <em>Edmond</em>.</p>
<p>A variation on this scam exists in Barcelona, Spain, but with the addition of a pickpocket. The dealer and shill behave in an overtly obvious manner, attracting a larger audience. When the pickpocket succeeds in stealing from a member of the audience, he signals the dealer. The dealer then shouts the word &#8220;aqua&#8221;, and the three split up. The audience is left believing that &#8220;aqua&#8221; is a code word indicating the police are coming, and that the performance was a failed scam.</p>
<p>In the <strong>Football Picks Scam</strong> the scammer sends out tip sheet stating a game will go one way to 100 potential victims and the other way to another 100. The next week, the 100 or so who received the correct answer are divided into two groups and fed another pick. This is repeated until a small population have (apparently) received a series of supernaturally perfect picks, then the final pick is offered for sale. Despite being well-known (it was even described completely on an episode of The Simpsons and used by Derren Brown in &#8220;The System&#8221;), this scam is run almost continuously in different forms by different operators. The sports picks can also be replaced with securities, or any other random process, in an alternative form. This scam has also been called the <strong>inverted pyramid</strong> scheme, because of the steadily decreasing population of victims at each stage.</p>
<p>&hellip;</p>
<p>Visitors to Las Vegas or other gambling towns often encounter the <strong>Barred Winner</strong> scam, a form of advance fee fraud performed in person. The artist will approach his mark outside a casino with a stack or bag of high-value casino chips and say that he just won big, but the casino accused him of cheating and threw him out without letting him redeem the chips. The artist asks the mark to go in and cash the chips for him. The artist will often offer a percentage of the winnings to the mark for his trouble. But, when the mark agrees, the artist feigns suspicion and asks the mark to put up something of value &#8220;for insurance&#8221;. The mark agrees, hands over jewelry, a credit card or their wallet, then goes in to cash the chips. When the mark arrives at the cashier, they are informed the chips are fake. The artist, by this time, is long gone with the mark&#8217;s valuables.</p>
<h3>False reward tricks</h3>
<p>The <strong>glim-dropper</strong> requires several accomplices, one of whom must be a one-eyed man. One grifter goes into a store and pretends he has lost his glass eye. Everyone looks around, but the eye cannot be found. He declares that he will pay a thousand-dollar reward for the return of his eye, leaving contact information. The next day, an accomplice enters the store and pretends to find the eye. The storekeeper (the intended griftee), thinking of the reward, offers to take it and return it to its owner. The finder insists he will return it himself, and demands the owner’s address. Thinking he will lose all chance of the reward, the storekeeper offers a hundred dollars for the eye. The finder bargains him up to $250, and departs.&hellip;</p>
<p>The <strong>fiddle game</strong> uses the pigeon drop technique. A pair of con men work together, one going into an expensive restaurant in shabby clothes, eating, and claiming to have left his wallet at home, which is nearby. As collateral, the con man leaves his only worldly possession, the violin that provides his livelihood. After he leaves, the second con man swoops in, offers an outrageously large amount (for example $50,000) for such a rare instrument, then looks at his watch and runs off to an appointment, leaving his card for the mark to call him when the fiddle-owner returns. The mark&#8217;s greed comes into play when the &#8220;poor man&#8221; comes back, having gotten the money to pay for his meal and redeem his violin. The mark, thinking he has an offer on the table, then buys the violin from the fiddle player (who &#8220;reluctantly&#8221; sells it eventually for, say, $5,000). The result is the two conmen are $5,000 richer (less the cost of the violin), and the mark is left with a cheap instrument.</p>
<p>&hellip;</p>
<h3>Other confidence tricks and techniques</h3>
<p>&hellip;</p>
<p><strong>The Landlord Scam</strong> advertises an apartment for rent at an attractive price. The con artist, usually someone who is house-sitting or has a short-term sublet at the unit, takes a deposit and first/last month&#8217;s rent from every person who views the suite. When move-in day arrives, the con artist is of course gone, and the apartment belongs to none of the angry people carrying boxes.</p>
<p>&hellip;</p>
<p><strong>Change raising</strong> is a common short con and involves an offer to change an amount of money with someone, while at the same time taking change or bills back and forth to confuse the person as to how much money is actually being changed. The most common form, &#8220;the Short Count&#8221;, has been featured prominently in several movies about grifting, notably Nueve Reinas, The Grifters and Paper Moon. A con artist shopping at, say a gas station, is given 80 cents in change because he lacks two dimes to complete the sale (say the sale cost is $19.20 and the con man has a 20 dollar bill). He goes out to his car and returns a short time later, with 20 cents. He returns them, saying that he found the rest of the change to make a dollar, and asking for a bill so he will not have to carry coins. The confused store clerk agrees, exchanging a dollar for the 20 cents the conman returned. In essence, the mark makes change twice.</p>
<p>&hellip;</p>
<p><strong>Beijing tea scam</strong> is a famous scam in and around Beijing. The artists (usually female and working in pairs) will approach tourists and try to make friends. After chatting, they will suggest a trip to see a tea ceremony, claiming that they have never been to one before. The tourist is never shown a menu, but assumes that this is how things are done in China. After the ceremony, the bill is presented to the tourist, charging upwards of $100 per head. The artists will then hand over their bills, and the tourists are obliged to follow suit.
</p></blockquote>
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		<title>Crazy anti-terrorism plans that worked</title>
		<link>http://blog.granneman.com/2009/02/12/crazy-anti-terrorism-plans-that-worked/</link>
		<comments>http://blog.granneman.com/2009/02/12/crazy-anti-terrorism-plans-that-worked/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 13 Feb 2009 05:48:21 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Scott Granneman</dc:creator>
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		<description><![CDATA[From a Special Operations officer quoted in Tom Ricks&#8217;s Inbox (The Washington Post: 5 October 2008): One of the most interesting operations was the laundry mat [sic]. Having lost many troops and civilians to bombings, the Brits decided they needed to determine who was making the bombs and where they were being manufactured. One bright [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>From a Special Operations officer quoted in Tom Ricks&#8217;s Inbox (The Washington Post: 5 October 2008):</p>
<blockquote><p>One of the most interesting operations was the laundry mat [sic]. Having lost many troops and civilians to bombings, the Brits decided they needed to determine who was making the bombs and where they were being manufactured. One bright fellow recommended they operate a laundry and when asked &#8220;what the hell he was talking about,&#8221; he explained the plan and it was incorporated &#8212; to much success.</p>
<p>The plan was simple: Build a laundry and staff it with locals and a few of their own. The laundry would then send out &#8220;color coded&#8221; special discount tickets, to the effect of &#8220;get two loads for the price of one,&#8221; etc. The color coding was matched to specific streets and thus when someone brought in their laundry, it was easy to determine the general location from which a city map was coded.</p>
<p>While the laundry was indeed being washed, pressed and dry cleaned, it had one additional cycle &#8212; every garment, sheet, glove, pair of pants, was first sent through an analyzer, located in the basement, that checked for bomb-making residue. The analyzer was disguised as just another piece of the laundry equipment; good OPSEC [operational security]. Within a few weeks, multiple positives had shown up, indicating the ingredients of bomb residue, and intelligence had determined which areas of the city were involved. To narrow their target list, [the laundry] simply sent out more specific coupons [numbered] to all houses in the area, and before long they had good addresses. After confirming addresses, authorities with the SAS teams swooped down on the multiple homes and arrested multiple personnel and confiscated numerous assembled bombs, weapons and ingredients. During the entire operation, no one was injured or killed.<br />
ad_icon</p>
<p>By the way, the gentleman also told the story of how [the British] also bugged every new car going into Northern Ireland, and thus knew everything [Sinn Fein leader] Gerry Adams was discussing. They did this because Adams always conducted mobile meetings and always used new cars.</p>
<p>The Israelis have a term for this type of thinking, &#8220;Embracing the Meshugganah,&#8221; which literally translated means, embrace the craziness, because the crazier the plan, the less likely the adversary will have thought about it, and thus, not have implemented a counter-measure. </p></blockquote>
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		<title>Why cons work on us</title>
		<link>http://blog.granneman.com/2009/02/12/why-cons-work-on-us/</link>
		<comments>http://blog.granneman.com/2009/02/12/why-cons-work-on-us/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 13 Feb 2009 05:41:14 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Scott Granneman</dc:creator>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.granneman.com/?p=1198</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[From Damien Carrick&#8217;s interview with Nicholas Johnson, &#8220;The psychology of conmen&#8221; (The Law Report: 30 September 2008): Nicholas Johnson: I think what I love most about con artists and the world of scammers is that they&#8217;re criminals who manage to get their victims to hand over their possessions freely. Most thieves and robbers and the [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>From Damien Carrick&#8217;s interview with Nicholas Johnson, &#8220;<a href="http://www.abc.net.au/rn/lawreport/stories/2008/2376933.htm">The psychology of conmen</a>&#8221; (The Law Report: 30 September 2008):</p>
<blockquote><p><strong>Nicholas Johnson</strong>: I think what I love most about con artists and the world of scammers is that they&#8217;re criminals who manage to get their victims to hand over their possessions freely. Most thieves and robbers and the like, tend to use force, or deception, in order for them to take things, whereas a con artist manages to get their victim to freely give up their stuff.</p>
<p>&#8230;</p>
<p>The main thing that really makes people susceptible to con artists is the idea that we&#8217;re going to get something for nothing. So it really buys into our greed; it buys into sometimes our lust, and at the same time, sometimes even our sense that we&#8217;re going to do something good, so we&#8217;re going to get a great feeling from helping someone out, we&#8217;re going to make some money, we&#8217;re going to meet a beautiful girl—it really ties into our basest desires, and that&#8217;s what the con artist relies on.</p>
<p>&#8230;</p>
<p>Most con artists rely on this idea that the victim is in control. The victim is the one who is controlling the situation. So a great example of that is the classic Nigerian email scam, the person who writes to you and says, &#8216;I&#8217;ve got this money that I need to get out of the country, and I need your help.&#8217; So you&#8217;re in control, you can help them, you can do a good deed, you can make some money, you&#8217;ve got this fantastic opportunity, and the con artist needs your help. It&#8217;s not the con artist doing you a favour. So really, you feel like you&#8217;re the one who&#8217;s controlling the situation when really it&#8217;s the con artist who knows the real deal.</p>
<p>&#8230;</p>
<p>I think for a lot of con artists they&#8217;re very proud of their work, and they like people to know exactly what they&#8217;ve gotten away with.</p>
<p>&#8230;</p>
<p>&#8230; for many of [the conmen], they really feel like even if they get caught, or even if they don&#8217;t get away with it, they feel like they&#8217;re giving their victim a good story, you know, something to dine out over, something to discuss down at the pub. They think that&#8217;s OK, you can scam somebody out of a couple of hundred bucks, because they&#8217;re getting a good story in return.</p>
<p>&#8230;</p>
<p>My all-time favourite one only makes the con artist a few dollars every time he does it, but I absolutely love it. These guys used to go door-to-door in the 1970s selling lightbulbs and they would offer to replace every single lightbulb in your house, so all your old lightbulbs would be replaced with a brand new lightbulb, and it would cost you, say $5, so a fraction of the cost of what new lightbulbs would cost. So the man comes in, he replaces each lightbulb, every single one in the house, and does it, you can check, and they all work, and then he takes all the lightbulbs that he&#8217;s just taken from the person&#8217;s house, goes next door and then sells them the same lightbulbs again. So it&#8217;s really just moving lightbulbs from one house to another and charging people a fee to do it.</p>
<p>But there&#8217;s all sorts of those homemaker scams, people offering to seal your roof so they say, &#8216;We&#8217;ll put a fresh coat of tar on your roof&#8217;, or &#8216;We&#8217;ll re-seal your driveway&#8217;. In actual fact all they do is get old black sump oil and smooth it over the roof or smooth it over the driveway. You come home and it looks like wet tar, and so &#8216;Don&#8217;t step on it for 24 hours&#8217;, and of course 24 hours later they&#8217;re long gone with the money, and you&#8217;re left with a sticky, smelly driveway.</p></blockquote>
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		<title>How con artists use psychology to work</title>
		<link>http://blog.granneman.com/2008/11/27/how-con-artists-use-psychology-to-work/</link>
		<comments>http://blog.granneman.com/2008/11/27/how-con-artists-use-psychology-to-work/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 28 Nov 2008 05:43:53 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Scott Granneman</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[business]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[science]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[brain]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[clever]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[help]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[hoax]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[power]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[psychology]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[social_engineering]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[tricks]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[tricky]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.granneman.com/?p=1014</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[From Paul J. Zak&#8217;s &#8220;How to Run a Con&#8221; (Psychology Today: 13 November 2008): When I was in high school, I took a job at an ARCO gas station on the outskirts of Santa Barbara, California. At the time, I drove a 1967 Mustang hotrod and thought I might pick up some tips and cheap [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>From Paul J. Zak&#8217;s &#8220;<a href="http://blogs.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-moral-molecule/200811/how-run-a-con">How to Run a Con</a>&#8221; (<em>Psychology Today</em>: 13 November 2008):</p>
<blockquote><p>When I was in high school, I took a job at an ARCO gas station on the outskirts of Santa Barbara, California. At the time, I drove a 1967 Mustang hotrod and thought I might pick up some tips and cheap parts by working around cars after school. You see a lot of interesting things working the night shift in a sketchy neighborhood. I constantly saw people making bad decisions: drunk drivers, gang members, unhappy cops, and con men. In fact, I was the victim of a classic con called &#8220;The Pigeon Drop.&#8221; If we humans have such big brains, how can we get conned?</p>
<p>Here&#8217;s what happened to me. One slow Sunday afternoon, a man comes out of the restroom with a pearl necklace in his hand. &#8220;Found it on the bathroom floor&#8221; he says. He followed with &#8220;Geez, looks nice-I wonder who lost it?&#8221; Just then, the gas station&#8217;s phone rings and a man asked if anyone found a pearl necklace that he had purchased as a gift for his wife. He offers a $200 reward for the necklace&#8217;s return. I tell him that a customer found it. &#8220;OK&#8221; he says, &#8220;I&#8217;ll be there in 30 minutes.&#8221; I give him the ARCO address and he gives me his phone number. The man who found the necklace hears all this but tells me he is running late for a job interview and cannot wait for the other man to arrive.</p>
<p>Huum, what to do? The man with the necklace said &#8220;Why don&#8217;t I give you the necklace and we split the reward?&#8221; The greed-o-meter goes off in my head, suppressing all rational thought. &#8220;Yeah, you give me the necklace to hold and I&#8217;ll give you $100&#8243; I suggest. He agrees. Since high school kids working at gas stations don&#8217;t have $100, I take money out of the cash drawer to complete the transaction.</p>
<p>You can guess the rest. The man with the lost necklace doesn&#8217;t come and never answers my many calls. After about an hour, I call the police. The &#8220;pearl&#8221; necklace was a two dollar fake and the number I was calling went to a pay phone nearby. I had to fess up to my boss and pay back the money with my next paycheck.</p>
<p>Why did this con work? Let&#8217;s do some neuroscience. While the primary motivator from my perspective was greed, the pigeon drop cleverly engages THOMAS (The Human Oxytocin Mediated Attachment System). &#8230; THOMAS is a powerful brain circuit that releases the neurochemical oxytocin when we are trusted and induces a desire to reciprocate the trust we have been shown&#8211;even with strangers.</p>
<p>The key to a con is not that you trust the conman, but that he shows he trusts you. Conmen ply their trade by appearing fragile or needing help, by seeming vulnerable. Because of THOMAS, the human brain makes us feel good when we help others&#8211;this is the basis for attachment to family and friends and cooperation with strangers. &#8220;I need your help&#8221; is a potent stimulus for action.</p></blockquote>
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		<title>Money involved in adware &amp; clicks4hire schemes</title>
		<link>http://blog.granneman.com/2008/11/22/money-involved-in-adware-clicks4hire-schemes/</link>
		<comments>http://blog.granneman.com/2008/11/22/money-involved-in-adware-clicks4hire-schemes/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Sun, 23 Nov 2008 04:30:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Scott Granneman</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[business]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[tech in changing society]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[canada]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[europe]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://blog.granneman.com/?p=961</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[From Chapter 2: Botnets Overview of Craig A. Schiller&#8217;s Botnets: The Killer Web App (Syngress: 2007): Dollar-Revenue and GimmyCash are two companies that have paid for installation of their Adware programs. Each has a pay rate formula based on the country of installation. Dollar-Revenue pays 30 cents for installing their adware in a U. S. [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>From Chapter 2: Botnets Overview of Craig A. Schiller&#8217;s <em>Botnets: The Killer Web App</em> (Syngress: 2007): </p>
<blockquote><p>
Dollar-Revenue and GimmyCash are two companies that have paid for installation of their Adware programs. Each has a pay rate formula based on the country of installation. Dollar-Revenue pays 30 cents for installing their adware in a U. S. Web site, 20 cents for a Canadian Web site, 10 cents for a U.K. Web site, 1 cent for a Chinese Web site, and 2 cents for all other Web sites. GimmyCash. com pays 40 cents for U. S. and Canadian Web site installs, 20 cents for 16 European countries, and 2 cents for everywhere else. In addition, GimmyCash pays 5 percent of the webmaster’s earnings that you refer to GimmyCash.
</p></blockquote>
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		<title>Take over a computer network with an iPod or USB stick</title>
		<link>http://blog.granneman.com/2006/12/10/take-over-a-computer-network-with-an-ipod-or-usb-stick/</link>
		<comments>http://blog.granneman.com/2006/12/10/take-over-a-computer-network-with-an-ipod-or-usb-stick/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Sun, 10 Dec 2006 17:21:45 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Scott Granneman</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[business]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[tech in changing society]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[bruce_schneier]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[clever]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[hacking]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[networks]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[surveillance]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.granneman.com/blog/2006/12/10/take-over-a-computer-network-with-an-ipod-or-usb-stick/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[From Bruce Schneier&#8217;s &#8220;Hacking Computers Over USB&#8221; (Crypto-Gram: 15 June 2005): From CSO Magazine: &#8220;Plug an iPod or USB stick into a PC running Windows and the device can literally take over the machine and search for confidential documents, copy them back to the iPod or USB&#8217;s internal storage, and hide them as &#8220;deleted&#8221; files. [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>From Bruce Schneier&#8217;s &#8220;<a href="http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0606.html#6">Hacking Computers Over USB</a>&#8221; (Crypto-Gram: 15 June 2005):</p>
<blockquote><p>From <em>CSO Magazine</em>:</p>
<p>&#8220;Plug an iPod or USB stick into a PC running Windows and the device can literally take over the machine and search for confidential documents, copy them back to the iPod or USB&#8217;s internal storage, and hide them as &#8220;deleted&#8221; files. Alternatively, the device can simply plant spyware, or even compromise the operating system. Two features that make this possible are the Windows AutoRun facility and the ability of peripherals to use something called direct memory access (DMA). The first attack vector you can and should plug; the second vector is the result of a design flaw that&#8217;s likely to be with us for many years to come.&#8221; &#8230;</p>
<p>Recently I&#8217;ve been seeing more and more written about this attack. The Spring 2006 issue of 2600 Magazine, for example, contains a short article called &#8220;iPod Sneakiness&#8221; (unfortunately, not online). The author suggests that you can innocently ask someone at an Internet cafe if you can plug your iPod into his computer to power it up &#8212; and then steal his passwords and critical files.</p>
<p>And about someone used this trick in a penetration test:</p>
<p>&#8220;We figured we would try something different by baiting the same employees that were on high alert. We gathered all the worthless vendor giveaway thumb drives collected over the years and imprinted them with our own special piece of software. I had one of my guys write a Trojan that, when run, would collect passwords, logins and machine-specific information from the user&#8217;s computer, and then email the findings back to us.</p>
<p>&#8220;The next hurdle we had was getting the USB drives in the hands of the credit union&#8217;s internal users. I made my way to the credit union at about 6 a.m. to make sure no employees saw us. I then proceeded to scatter the drives in the parking lot, smoking areas, and other areas employees frequented.</p>
<p>&#8220;Once I seeded the USB drives, I decided to grab some coffee and watch the employees show up for work. Surveillance of the facility was worth the time involved. It was really amusing to watch the reaction of the employees who found a USB drive. You know they plugged them into their computers the minute they got to their desks.</p>
<p>&#8220;I immediately called my guy that wrote the Trojan and asked if anything was received at his end. Slowly but surely info was being mailed back to him. I would have loved to be on the inside of the building watching as people started plugging the USB drives in, scouring through the planted image files, then unknowingly running our piece of software.&#8221;</p></blockquote>
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		<title>&#8220;Have you ever been admitted to a mental institution?&#8221;</title>
		<link>http://blog.granneman.com/2006/07/30/have-you-ever-been-admitted-to-a-mental-institution/</link>
		<comments>http://blog.granneman.com/2006/07/30/have-you-ever-been-admitted-to-a-mental-institution/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 31 Jul 2006 00:20:57 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Scott Granneman</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[business]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[history]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[language & literature]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.granneman.com/blog/2006/07/30/have-you-ever-been-admitted-to-a-mental-institution/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[From Tom Stites&#8217;s &#8220;Guest Posting: Is Media Performance DemocracyÃ¢â‚¬â„¢s Critical Issue?&#8221; (Center for Citizen Media: Blog: 3 July 2006): And then there were [Walter] AnnenbergÃ¢â‚¬â„¢s political shenanigans Ã¢â‚¬â€œ he shamelessly used his news columns [in The Philadelphia Inquirer] to embarrass candidates who dared to run against his favorites. One day in 1966 a Democrat named [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>From Tom Stites&#8217;s &#8220;<a href="http://citmedia.org/blog/2006/07/03/guest-posting-is-media-performance-democracys-critical-issue/">Guest Posting: Is Media Performance DemocracyÃ¢â‚¬â„¢s Critical Issue?</a>&#8221; (Center for Citizen Media: Blog: 3 July 2006):</p>
<blockquote><p>And then there were [Walter] AnnenbergÃ¢â‚¬â„¢s political shenanigans Ã¢â‚¬â€œ he shamelessly used his news columns [in <em>The Philadelphia Inquirer</em>] to embarrass candidates who dared to run against his favorites. One day in 1966 a Democrat named Milton Shapp held a press conference while running for governor and AnnenbergÃ¢â‚¬â„¢s hand-picked political reporter asked him only one question. The question was, Ã¢â‚¬Å“Mr. Shapp, have you ever been admitted to a mental institution?Ã¢â‚¬Â Ã¢â‚¬Å“Why no,Ã¢â‚¬Â Shapp responded, and went away scratching his head about this odd question. The next morning he didnÃ¢â‚¬â„¢t need to scratch his head any more. A five-column front page <em>Inquirer</em> headline read, Ã¢â‚¬Å“Shapp Denies Mental Institution Stay.Ã¢â‚¬Â IÃ¢â‚¬â„¢m not making this up. IÃ¢â‚¬â„¢ve seen the clipping Ã¢â‚¬â€œ a friend used to have a framed copy above his desk. Those were not the good old days.</p></blockquote>
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		<title>Checking papers does no good if the papers are forged</title>
		<link>http://blog.granneman.com/2006/07/13/checking-papers-does-no-good-if-the-papers-are-forged/</link>
		<comments>http://blog.granneman.com/2006/07/13/checking-papers-does-no-good-if-the-papers-are-forged/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 13 Jul 2006 21:50:50 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Scott Granneman</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[tech in changing society]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[bruce_schneier]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.granneman.com/blog/2006/07/13/checking-papers-does-no-good-if-the-papers-are-forged/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[From Bruce Schneier&#8217;s &#8220;News&#8221; (Crypto-Gram Newsletter: 15 April 2006): Undercover investigators were able to smuggle radioactive materials into the U.S. It set off alarms at border checkpoints, but the smugglers had forged import licenses from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, based on an image of the real document they found on the Internet. Unfortunately, the border [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>From Bruce Schneier&#8217;s &#8220;<a href="http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0604.html#8">News</a>&#8221; (<em>Crypto-Gram Newsletter</em>: 15 April 2006):</p>
<blockquote><p>Undercover investigators were able to smuggle radioactive materials into the U.S. It set off alarms at border checkpoints, but the smugglers had forged import licenses from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, based on an image of the real document they found on the Internet. Unfortunately, the border agents had no way to confirm the validity of import licenses. I&#8217;ve written about this problem before, and it&#8217;s one I think will get worse in the future. Verification systems are often the weakest link of authentication. Improving authentication tokens won&#8217;t improve security unless the verification systems improve as well.</p></blockquote>
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		<title>Killer search terms</title>
		<link>http://blog.granneman.com/2006/05/13/killer-search-terms/</link>
		<comments>http://blog.granneman.com/2006/05/13/killer-search-terms/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Sat, 13 May 2006 21:15:13 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Scott Granneman</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[deception]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[malware]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[search]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[spam]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[tricky]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.granneman.com/blog/2006/05/13/killer-search-terms/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[From The Inquirer&#8216;s &#8220;Killer phrase will fill your PC with spam&#8221;: THERE IS ONE phrase which, if you type into any search engine will expose your PC to shed-loads of spam, according to a new report. Researchers Ben Edelman and Hannah Rosenbaum reckon that typing the phrase &#8220;Free Screensavers&#8221; into any search engine is the [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>From <em>The Inquirer</em>&#8216;s <a href="http://www.theinquirer.net/?article=31675">&#8220;Killer phrase will fill your PC with spam&#8221;</a>:</p>
<blockquote><p>THERE IS ONE phrase which, if you type into any search engine will expose your PC to shed-loads of spam, according to a new report.</p>
<p>Researchers Ben Edelman and Hannah Rosenbaum reckon that typing the phrase &#8220;Free Screensavers&#8221; into any search engine is the equivalent of lighting a blue touch paper and standing well back. &#8230;</p>
<p>More than 64 per cent of sites that are linked to this phrase will cause you some trouble, either with spyware or adware. The report found 1,394 popular keywords searches found via Google, Yahoo, MSN, AOL and Ask that were linked to spyware or adware and the list is quite amusing. Do not type in the following words into any search engine:</p>
<p>Bearshare<br />
Screensavers<br />
Winmx<br />
Limewire<br />
Download Yahoo messenger<br />
Lime wire<br />
Free ringtones</p></blockquote>
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